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(2) If the court finds sufficient evidence to 
rebut the guidelines, the court shall establish 
support after considering all relevant factors, 
including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee 
for the support of others. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income - Imputed 
income• 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" 
includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, 
including nonearned sources, except under 
Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, 
commission, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts 
from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, 
pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from 
iii 
previous marriages, annuities, captial gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation 
benefits, unemployment compensation, disability 
insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-
tested government programs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(3). Definitions 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on 
the record supporting the conclusion that 
complying with a provision of the guidelines or 
ordering an award amount resulting from use of 
the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, 
or not in the best interest of a child in a 
particular case is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in that case. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT, BASED ON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE 
IT, ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO MODIFY 
THE DIVORCE DECREE TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT TO PAY 
AN INCREASED AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT. 
In his Reply Brief, Defendant, in the process of replying to 
Plaintiff's argument on cross-appeal that the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to modify the divorce decree to require 
Defendant to pay an increased amount of child support, directs this 
court to merely a portion of the changed circumstances that have 
occurred since the entry of the original decree of divorce. Such a 
position is disingenuous, to say the least, inasmuch as all of the 
material changed circumstances should be considered when reviewing 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to modify 
Defendant's child support obligation. See Woodward v. Woodward, 790 
P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 
739 (Utah App. 1992); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (1992). The trial 
courts refusal to modify the decree of divorce is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Muir, 841 P.2d at 739. 
Defendant's argument in his Reply Brief amounts essentially to 
the following: Because Defendant's income as set forth in trial 
Exhibit 11 is supported by admissible evidence, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to increase Defendant's child 
support obligation. Furthermore, in so doing, Defendant states, on 
page one of his Reply Brief, that "there is absolutely no basis to 
claim that these deposits [i.e., the unexplained deposits into 
Defendant's checking account] were unexplained." 
1 
With regard to Defendant's claim that there is "absolutely no 
basis" that the deposits were unexplained, the trial court, in the 
course of making its findings concerning Defendant's income, 
explicitly mentioned that Defendant received additional income that 
the court was unable to specifically identify. (Record 222-23; 1056; 
and Finding of Fact 7) The trial court's observation regarding 
Defendant's unexplained income came only after painstaking 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
Defendant's income, which included the trial court's observation of 
the credibility of the witnesses and testimony given at trial. See 
Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Argument #1, p. 20. 
Defendant, as previously stated, fails to direct the Court to 
all of the material changed circumstances warranting a modification 
of the original divorce decree so as to require Defendant to pay an 
increased amount of child support. The substantial change of 
circumstances warranting such a modification in the instant case are 
as follows: First, Defendant's net income at the time of the 
original decree was $1600.00 per month, as opposed to $3029.26 per 
month at the time the petition for modification in the instant case 
was filed (see Findings of Fact 4 and 5 and Brief of Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, Argument #1, p. 20 and Argument #4, pp. 36-37); 
Second, Plaintiff's gross income at the time of the original decree 
was $2390.60 per month as opposed to Plaintiff's income of $833.00 
per month at the time the petition was filed, which amounts to more 
than a sixty-five percent reduction (see Record at 1045; Finding of 
Fact 6; and Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Argument #1, pp. 
19-20 and Argument #4, p. 36); Third, the additional expenditures by 
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Plaintiff to maintain the minor child, Michelle, in private school, 
pursuant to the parties' desires, as opposed to Michelle's private 
preschool at the time of the original decree (see Record at 548-657; 
1059; 1135, lines 6-7; 1139, lines 17-19; and Brief of Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, Argument #1, pp. 20-24; Argument #4, pp. 37-38); 
and, since the original decree was entered, Plaintiff's loss of both 
her health care benefits and her TWA flight benefits, requiring 
additional expenditures on Michelle's behalf (see Record at 35-39; 
41; 658-720, 1058; 1126; Plaintiff's Exhibit 5; and Brief of Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant, Argument #4, p. 38). 
In reply to Plaintiff's argument that the trial court abused its 
discretion by refusing to impute additional income based on 
Defendant's past-earnings history and lifestyle, Defendant admits 
that he "worked on occasion since his medical retirement from the 
L.A. Police Department," but then states, that "at the time of trial, 
he was unable to [work] due to medical restrictions imposed by his 
doctors." Defendant's assertion concerning his inability to work is 
totally devoid of any supporting citation to the record. 
At trial, the court received evidence as to whether Defendant 
was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. (Record at 1243; 1256-
58). Notwithstanding the uncontroverted evidence that Defendant 
continued working after obtaining his disability (Record at 1243; 
1255-58; 1260-62), the court abused its discretion by failing to find 
that Defendant is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed or that 
Defendant was disabled to the point that he cannot work. See Brief 
of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Argument #5, pp. 38-41. 
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Defendant also argues that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting Defendant's medical testimony without any 
expert testimony or medical foundation. In support of his argument, 
Defendant claims that such testimony was admissible pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Evidence 602. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 602 allows a witness to testify to a 
matter if the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. However, 
Rule 602 is "subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to 
opinion testimony by expert witnesses." Additionally, Utah Rule of 
Evidence 702 states that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert . . . may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise." 
While Defendant's testimony regarding his heart attack and the 
medications he was taking was admissible because it was based on 
personal knowledge, Defendant's testimony as to his disability rating 
and medical condition, without any medical foundation, was 
inadmissible. By allowing such testimony, the trial court abused its 
discretion by enabling Defendant to rebut substantial contrary 
evidence that he had worked to supplement his disability income. 
Such testimony was self-serving, based on inadmissible hearsay, and 
was highly prejudicial in terms of the trial court's refusal to grant 
an increase in child support. See Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 
84, 89 (Utah App. 1989) ("The critical factor is whether the expert 
has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the 
4 
issues before it."); See Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
Argument #7, pp. 43-44). 
At page four of his Reply Brieff Defendant claims that by using 
the parties7 incomes in the child support guideline worksheet, 
Defendant's child support obligation would only be $250.00 per month. 
Such a calculation, however, is not accurate. Based on a calculation 
using the Child Support Obligation Worksheet set forth in Addendum C 
of the Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Defendant's child 
support obligation actually exceeds $300.00. See Brief of Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant, Argument #4, 35-38 and n.7. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE TO REQUIRE 
DEFENDANT TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE MINOR CHILD'S 
PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES. 
Although the trial court did not explicitly find that there had 
been a substantial change in circumstances regarding the private 
school expenses issue, the trial court's findings are sufficiently 
detailed for appellate review. See Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 
848-49 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)); Painter v. 
Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1991). 
In his Reply Brief, Defendant, in the process of arguing that 
the trial court abused its discretion to modify the divorce decree to 
require Defendant to pay for a portion of Michelle's private school 
expenses, again fails to identify or consider all of the 
circumstances that have substantially changed so as to warrant 
modification of the original divorce decree. The trial court's 
findings establish that there had been a substantial change in 
circumstances in the incomes of both the parties since the original 
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divorce decree, i.e., more than a sixty-five percent reduction in 
income for Plaintiff and more than a forty-five percent increase in 
income for Defendant (see Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
Argument #1, pp. 19-20).1 Moreover, the findings, in addition to the 
record, also establish that prior to the divorce becoming final, the 
parties had enrolled Michelle in Westchester Lutheran School,2 a 
private preschool, and that since the original decree, Plaintiff had 
expended substantial amounts of money for the enrollment of Michelle 
in Rowland-Hall St. Mark's private school. (Finding of Fact 18; 
Record at 1059). Finally, there is no basis for Defendant's claims 
on page five of his Reply Brief, as indicated by Defendant's complete 
failure to cite to the record or the trial court's findings of fact. 
In fact, as previously shown, both the record and the trial court's 
findings of fact support the trial court's determination on the 
private school expenses matter. See Brief of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant, Argument #1, pp. 17-24. 
On page six of his Reply Brief, Defendant argues that "the Court 
clearly erred in finding that Mr. Brooks had a financial ability to 
pay a portion of Michelle's private school expenses." In so doing, 
Defendant fails to "marshal the evidence which support the finding 
and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, [it is] clearly 
erroneous." Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991); 
1
 In making its findings, the trial court explicitly noted that 
Defendant had received additional income that the court was unable to 
specifically identify. (Record at 222-23; 1056). 
2
 Contrary to Defendant's assertion, at the time of the divorce, 
both of the parties were paying the costs associated with the private 
preschool. 
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accord Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989). A review of 
the record and the findings of fact and conclusions of lawf reveals 
that the trial court thoroughly reviewed all the evidence concerning 
Defendant's ability to pay. (Record at 1063; Finding of Fact 30). 
The trial court, after considering the totality of the circumstances, 
including Defendant's ability to pay, concluded that Defendant should 
be required to pay one-half of his daughter's private school 
expenses. 
Defendant argues, on page seven of his Reply Brief, that "[i]t 
is axiomatic that there would have been no petition to modify or 
trial in this matter if Mr. Brooks both wanted his daughter in 
private school and had the ability to pay for such an education." 
Such a conclusion, however, assumes that there are no other reasons 
for Defendant's refusal to contribute to the expense of educating his 
daughter, notwithstanding Defendant's express desire that Michelle 
attend a private school. (Record at 55, 1 11; 1135, lines 6-7; 1139, 
lines 17-19; Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, Declaration of Thomas M. Brooks, 
H 7, lines 11-19). To the contrary, other reasons or conclusions can 
be drawn from Defendant's refusal, such as Defendant's being too 
cheap, that Defendant does not care about Michelle to the extent that 
he would contribute to her education, or that Defendant only cares 
about Michelle when someone else pays her way. 
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3. THE TRIAL COURT NEITHER ERRED NOR DID IT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO 
OFFSET HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY ONE-HALF OF 
MICHELLE'S PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES WITH HER 
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. 
Argument II of Defendant's Reply Brief is essentially the same 
argument made by Defendant in Argument II of his opening brief. 
Plaintiff refuted Defendant's arguments regarding this issue in 
Argument two of her opening brief. See Brief of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant, Argument #2, pp. 24-31. Therefore, Plaintiff will not 
reiterate her position again. However, Plaintiff is compelled to 
make some observations in reply to Defendant's argument. 
In the process of making his argumentf Defendant 
mischaracterizes Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(8)(a) by claiming that 
Utah allows such a credit. Section 78-45-7.5(8)(a) provides: 
Social Security benefits received by a child 
due to the earnings of the parent may be 
credited as child support to the parent upon 
whose earning record it is based, by crediting 
the amount against the potential obligation of 
that parent. Other unearned income of a child 
may be considered as income to a parent 
depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
(Emphasis added.) As the clear language of the statute indicates, 
the trial court is not required to allow such a credit. Rather, by 
use of the word "may," the legislature intended to allow the court 
the exercise of its discretion in determining whether to allow such 
a credit. The trial court in the instant case did just that. In so 
doing, the trial court indicated its reasons for refusing Defendant 
a credit. First, the trial court recognized that the Social Security 
benefits received by the minor child belong to her, and as such, 
should not be used to meet her father's obligations. (Record at 
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1060, Finding of Fact 21). In other words, the minor child should 
not be required to foot the bill for her own education, especially in 
light of Defendant's desire that she attend a private school and his 
ability to pay. Second, Defendant should fulfill his obligations for 
one-half of the minor child's private school expenses from his own 
resources and not from the minor child's Social Security benefits. 
(Record at 1060, Finding of Fact 21). 
3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE AFTER THE 
CONCLUSION OF TRIAL TO ESTABLISH AMOUNTS CLAIMED 
AND SOUGHT AT TRIAL. 
In the process of arguing that the trial court abused its 
discretion in allowing Plaintiff to submit evidence after the 
conclusion of trial, Defendant misperceives the standard of review 
for reviewing the issue. In addition, Defendant again 
mischaracterizes both the factual and procedural events leading to 
both the trial court's request for and consideration of evidence, of 
which Defendant complains. The following statement of the relevant 
factual and procedural events, as quoted in Plaintiff's opening 
brief, is instructive: 
Following trial and the court's April 26, 
1991 minute entry, Plaintiff filed a motion for 
clarification of the court's ruling. (Record at 
292). In the motion, Plaintiff stated that 
disputes concerning the proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law needed to be 
resolved, and that certain matters in the 
court's minute entry needed clarification. 
Following Defendant's response, the court, on 
August 7, 1991, held a hearing on the motion. 
(Record 419-82). At the hearing, the trial 
court ordered Plaintiff to submit a motion to 
amend, pursuant to Utah Code of Jud. Admin. Rule 
4-501, addressing the following: (1) whether 
Defendant should receive a credit for the minor 
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child's Social Security benefits; (2) the amount 
of expenses paid by Plaintiff to maintain the 
minor child in private school; and (3) both the 
amount of the medical and dental expenses and 
transportation expenses paid for by Plaintiff. 
(Record at 292, 459). In the process, the trial 
court did not provide a deadline for filing the 
motion (Record at 460, lines 5-8), but instead 
allowed for its filing at "any time;" the court 
allowed Defendant thirty days for response, 
rather than the Rule 4-501(1)(b) ten-day 
response time. (Record at 13-22). The court, 
in setting the thirty-day response time, sought 
to provide Defendant with the opportunity to 
take depositions and anything else in response. 
(Record at 459-60). 
Because of the large amount of information 
and time required to accumulate the information 
requested by the court, Plaintiff, on November 
1, 1991, in accordance with the trial court's 
directive, filed her Motion for Post-trial 
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues. 
(Record at 527-731). Defendant responded with 
his untimely memorandum in opposition on 
December 6, 1991, which was more than the thirty 
days granted by the court for response.3 
(Record at 747-53). Defendant filed a 
Supplement on December 16, 1991 (Record at 777), 
and then he filed an "Answer" to the Plaintiff's 
"Motion for Post-Trial Determination of Divorce 
Modification Issues" on December 17, 1991. 
(Record at 780). Plaintiff filed motions to 
strike Defendant's untimely Supplement and 
Answer (Record at 759 and 7 88), which the court 
granted. (Record at 798). 
The trial court soundly exercised its discretion in not holding 
an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Not only had the matters been 
primarily decided at trial, the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law indicate that the trial court extensively considered the evidence 
and then ruled accordingly. The functional equivalent of cross-
examination took place by virtue of the extensive submissions of the 
parties, the evidence admitted at trial, and the resolution of the 
3
 Notwithstanding Defendant's untimely filing, the court 
considered Defendant's memorandum. (Record at 796). 
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expenses issue by affidavitsf written objections, correspondencef and 
meetings between the parties in the process of arriving at a 
stipulation. (Record at 1039-41; see Brief of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant, Statement of Facts 30-32, p. 15). Furthermore, the trial 
court spent one full day of trial observing the credibility of the 
witnesses who subsequently submitted the information of which 
Defendant now complains. 
In the process of advancing the aforementioned argument, 
Defendant distorts and misrepresents what is required under Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 43 by claiming that Rule 43 "requires testimony to 
be presented orally at trial." Rule 43 provides that "[w]hen a 
motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear 
the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the 
court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral 
testimony or depositions." (Emphasis added). The plain language of 
Rule 43 indicates that the requirement advanced by Defendant does not 
exist. Rather, the trial court is granted the discretion in 
determining whether the matter should be heard on affidavits or 
submissions of the respective parties. 
As indicated by Defendant's argument, Defendant apparently 
forgets that the instant issue is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. See Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 
1142, 1143 (Utah 1977). By virtue of his argument, Defendant would 
have this Court review the trial court's ruling on the post-trial-
consideration-of-evidence issue for what appears to be correction of 
error. Nothwithstanding Defendant's assertions, the record and the 
trial court's findings of fact indicate that the court did not abuse 
11 
its discretion in allowing submission of evidence, after trial, to 
establish amounts claimed and sought at trial. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ADJUST 
DEFENDANT'S TAX-FREE INCOME TO REFLECT — FOR 
PURPOSES OF CHILD SUPPORT CALCULATION — A GROSS 
INCOME EQUIVALENT TO A TAXABLE INCOME. 
On page fourteen of his Reply Brief, Defendant argues that 
"before the Court could take judicial notice of the calculation 
offered by the Plaintiff, the Court first had to make a legal 
determination as to whether the imputation of the additional amounts 
was legally appropriate." As indicated by Defendant's failure to 
cite to any authority, there is no authority for his proposition.4 
Additionally, Defendant states that Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5, 
which governs the determination of gross income for purposes of 
computing child support obligations, "does not differentiate between 
taxable and non-taxable gross income, and there is no legal authority 
upon which the Court may do so." Defendant's position is fallacious 
inasmuch as Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 et seq., Uniform Civil Liability 
of Support Act, includes the "child support guidelines" set forth in 
§ 78-45-7.2 through 7.18, which are rebuttable. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-45-2(6) and 78-45-7.2(1). Section 78-45-2(3) provides: 
A written finding or specific finding on the 
record supporting the conclusion that complying 
with a provision of the guidelines or ordering 
an award amount resulting from use of the 
guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or 
not in the best interest of a child in a 
4
 Defendant also makes the naked assertion that "the concept of 
judicial notice is not applicable to this issue and is, in fact, 
completely irrelevant." Again, Defendant fails to support his 
assertion with any citation of authority. 
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particular case is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in that case. 
In the instant case, the trial court should have found, based on 
the evidence concerning Defendant's tax-free disability income, that 
literally complying with § 78-45-7.5, in terms of determining the 
gross income of the parties, "would be unjust, inappropriate, or not 
in the best interests" of the minor child, Michelle. It was neither 
just nor appropriate for Plaintiff's share of child support to be 
based on taxable income while Defendant's share of child support was 
based on tax-free income. 
Under § 78-45-7.5, the trial court has the responsibility to 
equitably determine the gross income of the parties, which the court 
failed to do in the best interests of the minor child. The court's 
refusal to make such a determination, by not adjusting Defendant's 
tax-free pension, was an abuse of discretion. See Brief of Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant, Argument #6, 41-43. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
AWARDING JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF FOR ONE-HALF 
THE COSTS OF THE TRANSPORTATION FOR DEFENDANT'S 
VISITATION WITH MICHELLE FROM AND AFTER THE DATE 
OF FILING OF THE AMENDED PETITION TO MODIFY THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
In the process of arguing that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in regard to this issue, Defendant makes a number of naked 
and unsupported assertions.5 First, there is no basis in the record 
for Defendant's assertion concerning Mr. Nunley's gross income, and 
therefore, the assertion should be stricken. Second, Defendant's 
5
 Plaintiff has no contention with the claim made by Defendant 
in the second paragraph on page sixteen. In fact, to argue otherwise 
would be inconsistent with Plaintiff's position concerning the issue. 
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deceptive use of gross sales by Plaintiff's business — by throwing 
out a six-figure sum without any reference to net business income or 
Plaintiffs stipulated income of $833.00 gross per month (which was 
specifically found by the trial court) — is a blatant attempt to 
prejudice Plaintiff on appeal. Third, the trial court specifically 
found that it could not order Plaintiff's husband to provide flight 
benefits to Michelle for visitation purposes. (See Finding of Fact 
13). Finally, Defendant's naked assertion that Plaintiff, at the 
time of trial, was refusing to allow Defendant to exercise visitation 
unless he paid all associated costs is outrageous, to say the least, 
and should be stricken from the record on appeal. 
The trial court abused its discretion in requiring Plaintiff to 
pay one-half of the visitation transportation expenses because 
Defendant, based on Defendant's significant increase in income as 
compared to Plaintiff's substantial decrease in income, is in a 
better position to pay the transportation expenses. Furthermore, 
Defendant has the ability to pay. See Brief of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant, Argument #8, pp. 44-46. 
6. DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THIS COURT SHOULD 
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS FOR DEFENDING 
PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL IS TOTALLY LACKING IN 
MERIT. 
Defendant claims that "the issues on which Mrs. Nunley has 
chosen to cross appeal are frivolous and without legal and factual 
basis." In so doing, Defendant, pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 33 and 34, requests costs and attorney fees incurred in 
defending Plaintiff's cross-appeal. 
14 
Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that "if 
the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these 
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages 
. . . as defined in rule 34 and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party." Subsection (b) provides that "[f]or purposes of 
these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one 
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law." Accord Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 
1157 (Utah App. 1988); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 
1989). In determining whether an appeal is frivolous, sanctions for 
frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious cases, so as to 
avoid chilling the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions. 
See Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988). 
Upon review of Plaintiff's primary brief and Reply brief, the 
issues raised by Plaintiff on her cross-appeal are clearly grounded 
in fact, warranted by existing law, and based on goods faith 
arguments to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. The merit of 
Plaintiff's issues on cross-appeal is borne out by Defendant's own 
effort to refute Plaintiff's arguments on cross-appeal. In fact, 
Defendant's argument (that Plaintiff's issues on cross-appeal are 
frivolous) is frivolous itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the evidence before it, the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to modify the divorce decree to require 
Defendant to pay an increased amount of child support. The trial, 
15 
however, did not abuse its discretion in modifying the decree of 
divorce to require Defendant to pay one-half of Michelle's private 
school expenses. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing Plaintiff to submit evidence after the 
conclusion of trial to establish amounts claimed and sought at trial. 
By refusing to adjust Defendant's tax-free income to reflect — for 
purposes of child support calculation — a gross income equivalent to 
a taxable income, the trial court erred. The trial court abused its 
discretion by awarding judgment against Plaintiff for one-half of the 
costs of the transportation for Defendant's visitation with Michelle 
from and after the date of filing of the amended petition to modify 
the decree of divorce. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of January, 1994. 
RANDALL J. HOLMG 
HOLMGREN, ARNOLD 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DONALD WARD STEVENSON, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 920729-CA 
Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. STEVENSON PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS 
CLAIMS CONCERNING CROSS-EXAMINATION OF 
THE JAILHOUSE INFORMANT CONCERNING HIS 
RAP SHEET AND EXPUNGED CONVICTIONS AS 
THEY RELATE TO HIS BIAS AND MOTIVE TO 
FABRICATE OR LIE. 
(Responding to State's brief at Statement of Issues 
Nos. 3-5 and Standard of Review (p. 2), and 
Point II (pp. 26-36) . 
The controversy concerning Mr. Kingsbury's record arose 
in the context of defense counsel's cross examination concerning 
the aggravated assault charges pending against Mr. Kingsbury and 
the potential benefits he might gained in exchange for his 
testimony. See T.2 at 175-177. The following transpired: 
[By Mr. Valdez] Now, with a conviction of another 
felony, that could, in fact, land you in the prison, 
isn't that right, Mr. Kingsbury? 
MS. HORNAK: Objection. Again, he's referring 
to another felony, as though Mr. Kingsbury has a record, 
and I think it is prejudicial. 
MR. VALDEZ: Well, let me ask him about his 
record, then. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MS. HORNAK: I will object to that because that 
is prejudicial to the relevant --
MR. VALDEZ: I think that the iurv#s entitled 
to know if he has a record and has something to gain from 
this* His testimony --
THE COURT: We are not talking about his prior 
record. You may talk about the charges -- not 
necessarily the nature of the charges -- but the charges 
that are pending. 
The objection is sustained. 
T.2 at 176-7 (emphasis added). Defense counsel articulated his 
position that the jury is entitled to examine Mr. Kingsbury's 
record to the extent that it impacts on his bias and motive to lie. 
The trial court interrupted counsel and summarily sustained the 
State's objection. No waiver has occurred.1 
Additionally, the trial court expressly ruled on Mr. 
Stevenson's contention concerning admissibility for purposes of 
showing bias and motive to lie when he denied Mr. Stevenson's 
petition for certificate of probable cause. In support of this 
petition, Mr. Stevenson filed a copy of his amended brief with the 
trial court. R. 195-291. In denying the petition for certificate 
of probable cause, the trial court stated: 
Defendant's Motion for Certificate of Probable 
Cause is denied. Defendant has not demonstrated that 
there are substantial issues of law or fact likely to 
result in reversal or a new trial. 
The court premises its decision on a review of 
the appellate briefs in this matter. Additionally, the 
defendant has not demonstrated that there is any manner 
[sic] in Mr, Kingsbury's criminal history which could 
have been utilized at trial, 
R. 324 (Summary Decision and Order)(emphasis added). Even if Mr. 
Stevenson had originally waived the objection, the trial court's 
actions in addressing the issue on the merits revives the claim. 
State v. Seale, 853 P. 2d 862, 870 (Utah) ("Because the court 
^•Furthermore, an off the record discussion occurred shortly 
thereafter. T.2 at 177-8. There may have been further discussion 
of the bias/motive basis for admissibility at that time. 
2 
considered the alleged error rather than finding it waived, Seale's 
right to assert the issue on appeal was resuscitated. ") , cert. 
denied, U.S. , 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993); State v. Belcrard, 830 
P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 
(Utah 1991); State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991). 
Mr. Stevenson's objection to the failure of the State to 
provide a clean rap sheet is contained in the record at T. 27-2 9. 
The State even admits as much. State's brief at 26-27. The 
State's assertion that "defendant's objection to the prosecutor's 
alleged failure to provide him with a clean copy of Kingsbury's rap 
sheet is raised for the first time on appeal", State's brief at 31, 
is belied by the State's own admission. No waiver has occurred. 
POINT II. THE RAPE ELEMENTS JURY INSTRUCTION 
USED BY THE COURT WAS NOT PROPOSED BY 
DEFENDANT, AND THERE IS NO INVITED ERROR. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point III (pp. 37-
39) 
The State argues that the lack of a non-Spouse element in 
the rape elements jury instruction is invited error, and thus not 
reviewable on appeal. The rape elements instruction used by the 
trial court is neither that proposed by the prosecutor, nor that 
proposed by defendant. Compare R. 76 (defendant's proposed) with 
R. 119 (actually used) (copies are contained in State's brief at 
addendum F). The trial court apparently prepared its own elements 
instruction. Because defendant's instruction was not used, there 
is no invited error here. Even without an objection at trial, the 
3 
erroneous elements instruction requires reversal. State v. Jones, 
823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
The State's waiver and invited error arguments are 
without merit. Mr. Stevenson's claims should be addressed on the 
merits. j 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of May, 1994. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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